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Abstract  
High intergenerational social mobility is by scholars depicted as something good. However, 
high intergenerational social mobility not only encompasses mobility upward but also 
mobility downward. It has been found by previous scholars that mobility direction affects 
political distrust, nonetheless there is still little research on the adverse political outcomes of 
intergenerational social mobility direction. This thesis aims to partly fill this gap by 
contrasting individuals experiencing upward mobility with individuals experiencing mobility 
downward. Asymmetry in mobility direction is expected to affect satisfaction with 
democracy; individuals experiencing mobility upward will be more satisfied because they 
ascribe their mobility to individual efforts, whereas individuals experiencing mobility 
downward will be less satisfied because they blame political institutions for their mobility 
direction. Two hypotheses are formed and tested. I use the European Social Survey Round 8 
dataset to analyse how mobility direction affects satisfaction through Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. The variables controlled for are age, domestic origin, gender and educational 
level. The results suggest that the hypotheses partially hold. Individuals who are mobile 
downwards are not less satisfied with democracy than the reference group as a whole, but 
they are less satisfied with democracy than individuals mobile upward. Non-mobile 
individuals are found to be the least satisfied. This concludes that it is mobility levels rather 
than direction that causes dissatisfaction.  
Key words: Satisfaction with democracy; Intergenerational social mobility; Mobility direction  
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1. Introduction 
Satisfaction with democracy is by many scholars said to be of vital importance for political 
stability in democratic countries (Quaranta & Martini 2016:165). Under recent years, political 
discontent in Europe has become a pressing issue for European policymakers (Bache et al. 
2015, Piketty 2015, Quaranta 2015). Economic inequalities, wage stagnation and lack of 
opportunities are the alleged causes of the growing discontent (Ingham 2008: 157, 174, 
212-213, Quaranta 2015, Day & Fiske 2016). Inequalities of income and wealth and social 
mobility are not the same thing, but can be related if the wealth of one generation determines 
the wealth of the next (Putnam 2016: 31). Intergenerational social mobility allows inequalities 
in income and wealth to persist, but can prevent the relative inequalities from skyrocketing in 
different directions because opportunities to education and income are redistributed between 
classes (Putnam 2016: 41-43). Social mobility is usually portrayed as distribution of 
opportunities between individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds, and is depicted 
as something inherently good (Putnam 2016: 31, Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017, 
Friedman 2013, Björklund, Roine & Waldenström 2008, Corak 2013, Ichino, Karabarbounis 
& Moretti 2010). However, high mobility is not necessarily entirely positive; it might also 
bring certain problems along with it. High mobility also includes mobility downward, which 
under some circumstances might result in unwanted outcomes (Daenekindt, van der Waal & 
de Koster 2017, Day & Fiske 2016, Friedman 2013). Directions of intergenerational social 
mobility have been shown to affect how citizens evaluate the political system (ibid). For 
instance, low mobility decreases the likelihood of system justification and mobility downward 
results in political distrust (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017, Day & Fiske 2016). 
The direction of mobility might have even stronger implications as differences in relative 
distribution increase. Scholars express a need to further understand how social mobility, 
perceived or de facto, affects political outcomes (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017,  
Day & Fiske 2016, Friedman 2013, Wagner, Schneider & Halla 2009: 33). This issue is what I 
in this thesis will address. Previous literature has found that intergenerational social mobility 
explains lack of system justification and trust in politics because citizens who experience low 
or downward mobility do not perceive the system as meritocratic, i.e., that it produces 
outcomes that are fair with regard to individual effort (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 
2017, Day & Fiske 2016).  
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We still know little about the potential negative political outcomes of high intergenerational 
social mobility. If there is no knowledge on what the outcomes are and how they occur, 
nothing can be done to address the negative political outcomes, for instance low satisfaction 
with democracy or low political trust (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017). To study 
how intergenerational social mobility direction affects satisfaction with democracy would 
give more knowledge on this subject, and might improve our understanding of the 
relationship between evaluation of the system and feelings of injustice and mobility.  
I will argue that intergenerational social mobility affects satisfaction with democracy. The 
direction in which individuals are mobile will affect their perceptions of why they have 
moved in a certain direction. When individuals experience downward mobility, they will put 
the blame on the system for not correcting for factors that they themselves do not believe they 
carry the responsibility for (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017, Day & Fiske 2016, 
Lühiste 2014, Rothstein 2013: 1010, 1014, Spicker 2008). If they move upward however, they 
will ascribe their achievement to individual efforts (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 
2017, Day & Fiske 2016). Given that social mobility under certain circumstances may result 
in undesirable outcomes, this study can contribute with important knowledge on political 
outcomes of high social mobility. Moreover, it may give explanations to the current political 
climate in European democracies.  
1.1. Aim & Research Question 
Building on previous literature this thesis aims to further elaborate this branch of scholarship 
by studying how social mobility affects political outcomes, and, more importantly, to pinpoint 
that high social mobility can have adverse effects. The research question is therefore:  
Does intergenerational social mobility direction in European democracies affect satisfaction 
with democracy? 
At a time when relative inequality is increasing, information on how satisfaction with 
democracy is affected by intergenerational mobility downwards might give answers to some 
of the most discussed topics on European democracy (Ingham 2008: 212-213). Lack of 
legitimacy is portrayed as one of the most pressing dissatisfaction concerns for the European 
Union, and is often explained as a result of the alleged democratic deficit of the union (Bache 
et al. 2015, Piketty 2015). If a great deal of the European constituency has experienced 
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intergenerational social mobility downward and if this change has caused low satisfaction 
with democracy, this might be an alternative explanation to dissatisfaction.  
To the general public it is of interest because it is they who are subject to social mobility, and 
it is they who express satisfaction with democracy. To know the cause of this satisfaction, or 
dissatisfaction for that matter, and the consequences of social mobility, is important because 
the ideal situation is that satisfaction is high since it indicates well functioning democratic 
institutions and political stability (Linde & Ekman 2003: 400, Quaranta & Martini 2016:165). 
If there are negative outcomes of high mobility such as low trust or low satisfaction with 
democracy, these must be addressed. Low trust for instance, implies low life satisfaction 
(Nannestad 2008). 
Below follows a literature review on satisfaction with democracy and intergenerational social 
mobility, followed by a theoretical framework, hypotheses, method and data discussion, 
results and an analytical discussion of the results and conclusions in that order.  
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2. Literature Review 
Below I present a review of literature on intergenerational social mobility, the political 
outcomes of social mobility and satisfaction with democracy and how this study will 
contribute to existing literature. The purpose of the literature’s review is to find the existing 
literature’s most accurate answer to the research question. 
2.1. Intergenerational Mobility & Potential Political Outcomes  
Considering previous studies on the subject, intergenerational social mobility is often 
assumed to be a goal for all societies that strive to achieve meritocratic societal openness and 
equal opportunities for all (Björklund, Roine & Waldenström 2008, Corak 2013, Daenekindt, 
van der Waal & de Koster 2017:10, Friedman 2013:1-2, Ichino, Karabarbounis & Moretti 
2010). This assumption has however led researchers to almost exclusively discuss mobility 
measurements and origins rather than trying to empirically establish its causes and 
consequences (Friedman 2013: 2). High intergenerational social mobility does not necessarily 
result in solely positive outcomes (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017, Friedman 
2013). 
2.1.1. Levels of intergenerational social mobility  
Intergenerational social mobility is a situation in which an individual has a different social 
situation than its parents (Daenekindt 2016). The intergenerational correlation coefficient 
describes how factors in a parent’s life affect the child’s future opportunities to reach certain a 
class, level of education or income, i.e., how family or parental socioeconomic status 
determines an individual’s future opportunities (Bladen 2013:38, Björklund & Jäntti 2011: 
510, Causa & Johansson 2010, Smeeding 2013: 4). The values of the intergenerational 
correlation coefficient  in some European democracies are listed in Table 1 and show that 1
aggregate intergenerational social mobility within the European democracies used in this 
analysis vary a great deal. Finland, for instance has a great deal of intergenerational social 
 The intergenerational correlation coefficient β, represents the relationship between parental income in 1
period t-1 the individuals adult income in period t. For the sake of simplicity, an individual is assumed to live 
for two periods, t-1 and t (Frid & Hermann 2016:7). The variables in the equation below are the intercept a, 
and yᵗ the individuals income as an adult in period t. Then there’s correction factor εᵗ, that captures 
everything that effects yᵗ apart from the parental income yᵗ⁻¹ and finally β, which represents the relationship 
between parental income in period t-1 the individuals adult income in period t .  
     yᵗ = a + (β x yᵗ⁻¹) + εᵗ 
This equation is referred to as the Becker & Tomes (1979) model (in Frid & Hermann 2016:7).
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mobility; it is very common for individuals to have another income, educational level or class 
compared to their parents. In Slovenia and the United Kingdom, however, this is more 
uncommon, which is shown by the high values of β. The income, educational level or class of 
an individual is highly correlated with the parents ditto. This data is presented to give an idea 
of how mobility levels vary within this study’s analysed population. 
Table 1: The Beta-coefficient in European countries. 
Source: Corak 2012 
2.1.2. Political Outcomes of Intergenerational Social Mobility  
Not until very recently has intergenerational social mobility been considered an independent 
variable with both positive and negative outcomes (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 
2017, Day & Fiske 2016). The literature on political outcomes of intergenerational social 
mobility has traditionally focused on how social mobility affects voting behaviour 
(Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 2). One study on this, by Clifford and Heath 
(1993:57), finds that the direction of intergenerational social mobility does not affect turnout, 
but it does however affect political right-left preferences. However the literature on the 
overall political outcomes of social mobility direction is scarce; only two recent studies have 
examined the political outcomes of intergenerational social mobility. 
Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster (2017) study whether and how intergenerational 
social mobility downward causes individuals to distrust in politics as a result of them 
ascribing their misfortunes to the functioning of the political system and therefore perceiving 
Country 𝛽-value
Switzerland 0,46
Germany 0,32
Sweden 0,27
Slovenia 0,54
Finland 0,18
France 0,41
United Kingdom 0,50
Norway 0,17
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it as unfair (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 5). They mean that the 
psychological experience of being mobile in different directions explains their attitudes to 
political institutions. For instance, it has been shown that mobility downward results in a 
feeling of injustice, while upward mobility is attributed to one’s own efforts (Newman 1989, 
Spruyt 2015). More findings related to this are the findings on internal-external attribution 
styles. Failure is shown to go hand in hand with external attribution style. Individuals who 
experience failure blame external occurrences, while success is praised as self-achievement 
(Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 11). By using Diagonal Reference Models to 
analyse data from the Netherlands’ Longitudinal Life-course Study, the researchers find that 
individuals who have experienced intergenerational mobility downward are more likely to 
show distrust in politics (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017:10-11). Upward 
mobility, however, does not seem to affect system explanations (ibid.). Daenekindt, van der 
Waal and de Koster (2017) claim that the reason for this is that upward mobility is by the 
individual thought to occur because of personal characteristics, independent of how political 
institutions function. Upward mobility is perceived as a reward to individual efforts, made 
possible by meritocratic institutions, while mobility downwards is by individuals explained as 
a cause of unjust institutions. The results show that downward mobility creates political 
distrust (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 10).   It is possible that the relationship 2
between mobility direction and satisfaction with democracy takes the same shape. However, 
the results that find upward mobility to cause less distrust (relative to the downwardly mobile 
group) are not statistically significant (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 11). It 
could be that downward mobility experience affects the individual to a much larger extent 
than upward mobility (ibid).  
Day and Fiske (2016) arrive at similar conclusions when they examine whether perceptions of 
social mobility affect willingness to defend the system. System defence decreases when 
participants in the experimental study perceive mobility as low (Day & Fiske 2016: 271-272). 
Mediation of mobility was designed by giving participants different reports on social mobility. 
Willingness to defend the system decreases when the individual perceives its own mobility as 
low, since it damages the individual’s opinion of the fairness of the system (Day & Fiske 
 Important to note is that political trust is not satisfaction with democracy. However one can imagine that 2
one is not particularly satisfied with institutions that one does not trust. Hence, political trust and satisfaction 
with democracy can be said to be related concepts.  
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2016: 272). This relationship persists when political orientation is controlled for (ibid.).  The 3
data they use is set in an American context, and though political systems in European 
democracies and in the United States have similarities, they are by no means equivalent. The 
findings of Day and Fiske (2016) are not extensive enough to draw conclusions between 
satisfaction with democracy and social mobility direction, since the study does not study 
mobility direction but mobility levels. This thesis will pick up on the requests of previous 
scholars to examine political outcomes of mobility and try to explain how mobility direction 
can affect satisfaction with democracy in European democracies. 
Both Day and Fiske (2016) and Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster (2017) find that 
political outcomes of mobility direction and levels are shaped by a tendency to perceive 
meritocratic principles differently. It is possible that the mechanism behind social mobility 
that affects political outcomes is the individual’s perceptions of meritocracy. These 
perceptions vary with mobility, as Day and Fiske (2016) and Daenekindt, van der Waal and de 
Koster (2017) find. Following this conclusion, this study will theorise that satisfaction with 
democracy is affected by social mobility direction, because mobility direction gives the 
individual different experiences which affect perceptions of meritocracy and hence 
satisfaction.  
2.1.3. The Satisfaction with Democracy Literature  
Satisfaction with democracy is one of the most common measures of how content citizens are 
with the current regime, and the concept has been widely studied. Satisfaction with 
democracy has predominantly been explained by variation in institutional factors such as the 
constitutional prerequisites for political actors in the political system and the quality of 
government (Quaranta & Martini 2016:165, Thomassen 2001, Stockemer & Sundström 2013: 
141). For example, the more consensual a democracy’s political system is, the more likely it is 
that losers are satisfied with the current system, while winners are less satisfied (Anderson & 
Guillory 1997: 78). Aarts and Thomassen (2008: 17) claim that it is the fact that consensual 
democracies are more representative of the electorate that causes citizens in proportional 
systems to be more satisfied with their regime, i.e., accountability is less important in the 
 It should be said that the perceptions of mobility are not the equivalent of every individual’s actual 3
mobility. However, the theory in this thesis will state that mobility will affect satisfaction with democracy 
because they feel unfairly treated when background factors are not controlled for. Implicitly then, it will be 
assumed that the individual has some kind of perception of mobility that is in line with their actual mobility. 
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evaluation process. Quality of government has been found to be a strong determinant of 
satisfaction with democracy (Stockemer & Sundström 2013, Wagner, Schneider & Halla 
2009). Social mobility varies in many ways with corruption, because corruption favours those 
who are already in leading positions in society (Boudreaux 2014:13). Regardless of the 
relationship between corruption and social mobility however, they are two different concepts 
that can independently affect satisfaction with democracy. A more recent study examines how 
individual satisfaction with social protection systems predict satisfaction with democracy 
(Lühiste 2014). These results might tell us that social mobility, inequalities and satisfaction 
with democracy are closely related. 
2.1.4. Income inequality, Social Mobility Levels & Satisfaction with Democracy  
Social mobility level is closely related to income inequalities (Bladen 2013: 62, Causa & 
Johansson 2010, Corak 2006, 2013:3, Putnam 2016: 31, 41-43, Smeeding 2013). Corak 
(2013:3) illustrates a close relationship between the Gini-coefficient and mobility though the 
Great Gatsby curve, where higher Gini-value corresponds with lower intergenerational 
mobility. However, in Jumping off the Great Gatsby Curve, Boudreaux (2014:13) finds that it 
is institutions that foster entrepreneurship and low corruption that cause high mobility. 
Mobility also varies within income brackets; low and high income individuals are less mobile 
than middle income individuals (Bratberg et al. 2017:91). This might tell us that it is middle 
income individuals who are most likely to also be mobile downwards.  
In countries with higher income equality, citizens express more satisfaction with the current 
democratic regime (Anderson & Singer 2008:564-565,583). Inequalities in income and wealth 
and levels of social mobility as stated earlier, are not to be confused as the same thing 
(Putnam 2016: 31). Theoretically at least, relative poverty can be very large without it being 
perceived as unfair, as long as mobility between individuals in different income brackets is 
very high (Frid & Hermann 2016:13). Given that everyone in this theoretical society is above 
an absolute poverty level, this kind of society might even be desirable since it creates high 
incentives for individuals to work hard for what they want (ibid.).  
However, high mobility implicitly means that some individuals end up being worse off than 
their parents. Given that income inequality has risen in the past thirty years and that it is 
middle income takers who are the most mobile, and therefore most likely to be mobile 
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downward, this might have caused some individuals, most likely in the middle class, to drop 
down into the lower income deciles (Bratberg et al. 2017:91, Ingham 2008: 157, 174, 
212-213). If some have dropped in income, this might result in their children acquiring a 
lower level of education, for instance.  4
2.2. The Gap & Contribution To Existing Literature 
Existing literature has found many solid explanations to satisfaction with democracy and 
intergenerational social mobility separately. Be that as it may, the relationship between the 
two is understudied. Conclusions need to be tested further to be able to establish a broader 
knowledge of the relationship and the possible implications it might have for both policy and 
future research on democracy evaluation (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 10, 
Day & Fiske 2016). Moreover, the social mobility literature is particularly interested in 
mobility levels. In this study I will examine intergenerational social mobility direction. This 
study will fill the existing literature gap by searching for political consequences of social 
mobility direction. By utilising European Social Survey’s latest dataset this thesis shall try to 
answer if intergenerational social mobility has any implications for political behaviour, by 
examining whether the mobility direction affects satisfaction with democracy. Thus the results 
contribute to the field of mobility and regime support studies. 
 It should be noted that there are many factors that affect a child’s educational performance (Putnam 2016).4
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3. Theoretical Framework 
Using a common definition of satisfaction with democracy I will in this thesis theorise that 
satisfaction with democracy is negatively affected by social mobility downwards. Like 
previous studies I will in this thesis use Linde and Ekman’s (2003) definition of satisfaction 
with democracy (Dahlberg, Ekman & Holmberg 2013:5 Stockemer & Sundström 2013:141, 
Wagner, Scheider & Halla 2009:32, Quaranta & Martini 2016). Satisfaction with democracy 
is not the citizen’s evaluation of democratic values and principles per se, but rather an 
indication of how satisfied citizens are with the performance and outcomes of democratic 
institutions (Linde & Ekman 2003: 393). It should also be noted that not only the evaluation 
of actual performance is expressed when citizens declare their satisfaction with democracy, 
but also the lack of performance (Linde & Ekman 2003: 400).  
3.2. How the Direction of Intergenerational Social Mobility Affects Satisfaction with 
Democracy  
Individuals with intergenerational social mobility downward are more likely to resort to 
institutional explanations for their mobility whereas upward mobility is affiliated with the 
belief that one is rewarded for hard work (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017:11 , 
Newman 1989, Spruyt 2015). The argument that satisfaction with democracy is affected by 
intergenerational social mobility is based on the assumption that when one experiences 
intergenerational social mobility downward this will be perceived as unjust. Day and Fiske 
(2016) and Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster (2017) find that political outcomes of 
mobility are shaped by a tendency to perceive meritocratic principles differently, depending 
on level and direction. This thesis will theorise that the mechanism behind social mobility 
affecting political outcomes, is the individual’s perceptions of meritocracy. The relationship 
between intergenerational social mobility and satisfaction with democracy can be illustrated 
as in figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Theoretical Model.  
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Mobility 
Perceptions of 
Meritocracy
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
High mobility is often depicted as something inherently good, something indicating an open 
and equal society (Björklund, Roine & Waldenström 2008, Corak 2013, Daenekindt, van der 
Waal & de Koster 2017:10, Friedman 2013:1-12, Ichino, Karabarbounis & Moretti 2010). 
However, high mobility not only encompasses mobility upward but also mobility downward. 
If one is worse off than one’s parents, one is prone to feel misfortunate and is more likely than 
upwardly mobile individuals to blame democratic institutions for one’s 
”misfortune” (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017). Day and Fiske (2017) find that 
the theoretical premise is that the likelihood of system justification (in this case a democratic 
system) decreases when individuals experience low intergenerational social mobility, which 
leads one to think that the same might occur if one moves down in the social hierarchy in 
relation to one’s parents. If adult income differences are large between parents and child, one 
can expect this to cause a relatively low satisfaction with democracy. Thus, as mobility 
downward increases (in relative terms, i.e., the larger the difference between parental and 
one’s own income), the more one can expect satisfaction with democracy to decrease.  5
3.3. Specified Aim & Hypotheses 
Below follows a description of the specified aim and hypotheses. 
3.3.1. Specified Aim 
The aim of this dissertation is to study whether intergenerational social mobility direction 
affects satisfaction with democracy. By contrasting individuals experiencing upward mobility 
with individuals experiencing mobility downward this thesis will be able to answer if 
direction matters for citizens’ satisfaction with democratic output. The study will focus on the 
asymmetry in satisfaction between the upwardly mobile and the downwardly mobile. 
3.3.2. Hypotheses 
Individuals who move upwards ascribe their success to their own individual efforts while 
individuals who are mobile downwards resort to institutional explanations. Individuals who 
experience high mobility downward can be expected to express low satisfaction with 
 Inherited wealth might function as a parachute for individuals with de facto downward mobility as 5
inheritance allows them to uphold certain living standards. Therefore it should also be noted that mobility 
direction could affect satisfaction with democracy differently depending on the individuals net worth. I.e. 
there might be an interaction affect between intergenerational mobility direction and economic inequality. 
However this is left to future studies to elaborate and empirically underpin. 
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democracy, because one is more likely to blame political institutions for misfortunes than to 
give them credit for success (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017:10-11, Day & Fiske 
2016: 272). The mechanism that creates the asymmetry, or the satisfaction gap if you will, 
between upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals is their differentiated perception of the 
rule of meritocracy in their society. This brings us to the two hypotheses that are to be tested.  
H1: Individuals who experience intergenerational social mobility downwards will express less 
satisfaction with democracy compared to others, because they do not believe that society 
operates according to meritocratic principles.  
H2: Individuals who experience intergenerational social mobility upwards will be more 
satisfied with democracy compared to others, because they ascribe their mobility to their own 
individual efforts. 
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4. Design & Method 
To fulfil the purpose and answer the research question, I will use statistic design. This design 
makes it possible to control for variables that covary with both the independent and dependent 
variable and allows us to analyse many units at the same time (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 97-99). 
The data will be collected from European Social Survey and I will analyse the data by using 
Ordinary Least Squares (Cortinas & Black 2012: 494, 580, Lühiste 2014, Wagner, Scheider & 
Halla 2009). Below follows an account for design, data and operationalisation of the 
theoretical concepts, and how cofounding variables will be controlled for.  
4.1. Research Design & Method of Analysis 
In this section I will argue that a statistical design and method is appropriate to test the 
hypotheses and answer the research question.  
To be able to answer the research question one needs to be able to determine whether there is 
an overall pattern for how direction of intergenerational mobility and satisfaction with 
democracy covary. To do this, it is appropriate to analyse how satisfaction with democracy 
and intergenerational mobility vary across many units.  Statistic design is appropriate for such 
an analysis (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 98-100).  
The theoretical framework discusses how intergenerational social mobility can affect 
individuals’ satisfaction with democracy under certain circumstances, which presupposes an 
ability to generalise to a larger population. Since the purpose is to test the theory, statistic 
design and method is appropriate (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 97-99, 346-347). Linear regression is 
particularly useful because there exist various variables that will need to be controlled for 
before any conclusions can be drawn (Cortinas & Black 2012: 494, 580, Esaiasson et al. 
2012: 97-99, 346-347). If a simple correlation was done it would be difficult to certify that 
eventual results are not biased by a cofounding variable (ibid).  
4.2. Data 
This section will briefly discuss the choice of data and why it is appropriate for testing the 
hypotheses and answer the research question. Possibilities to generalise to a larger population 
from this data will also be discussed.  
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The data that will be used comes from European Social Survey Round 8 (European Social 
Survey 2016a). The data is of high quality and many of the survey questions are formed in 
such a way that they deliberately capture the theoretical concepts of this thesis (European 
Social Survey 2016b, 2016c, Thomassen 2001).   
Moreover, this study aims to explore how intergenerational social mobility affects satisfaction 
among European citizens. The data will not be analysed in a comparative cross-county setting, 
which means no country-comparative conclusions will be drawn. Rather, each individual will 
be analysed and therefore conclusions will regard individual behaviour notwithstanding what 
country the individual resides in. According to the research question, it is individuals within 
European democracies that are the units of analysis. Consequently, the population to which 
the thesis aims to generalise must be European citizens. The respondents in European Social 
Survey are randomly selected to represent the composition of the European population in all 
relevant aspects, and hence allows the conclusions to be generalised to a wider European 
population (European Social Survey 2016c). The extensiveness of the data might also allow 
for generalisations to a non European population to be made. 
4.2.2. Excluded Data 
This is not to say that national context is of no importance for individual mobility, evaluations 
of meritocracy and satisfaction of democracy. However, cross-country comparisons is a task 
for future research projects. The counties included in Round 8 are Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom (European Social Survey 2016a). According to Freedom House’s (2017) democracy 
index the Russian Federation does not qualify as a democracy. Therefore, Russia will be 
excluded from the analysis, since satisfaction with democracy might have an entirely different 
meaning to Russian citizens. Their conception of the term might not be in accordance to 
Linde and Ekman’s (2003) definition. 
Israel is not strictly speaking situated on the European continent. However, European Social 
Survey has made the decision to include Israel for the supposed reason that data on the 
country is relevant to fulfil the projects’ aims. Therefore Israel’s geographical location shall be 
ignored and the data from the country will not be excluded, since there is no reason to believe 
that this might hamper the results (European Social Survey 2017, Freedom House 2017).  
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4.3. Method & Data Critique  
When testing hypotheses, survey data is appropriate to use because it shows the frequency of 
every answer within the sample (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 29). There are also issues with using 
survey data. For one thing the questions are standardised, which can potentially be a problem 
because it makes it more difficult to gather information about respondents’ perceptions and 
thoughts of the world and why exactly the respondents’ perceptions and thoughts are in a 
certain way. In this respect, interviews might have been a more appropriate method, and is 
something future studies might explore (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 252-254). However, even 
though the perceptions are an important part of the theoretical framework, the research 
question and the hypotheses aim to work out if there is a general pattern in the relationship 
between intergenerational social mobility and satisfaction with democracy and, most 
importantly, to test the causality in this relationship. For this, a quantitative method of 
gathering data is more appropriate than a qualitative one (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 29). Because 
of its ability to attest frequency in the answers, survey data can tell us whether downwardly 
mobile individuals tend to be less satisfied than their upwardly mobile citizens. Survey data 
also allows the results and conclusions to be generalised to a larger population, because the 
respondents have been randomly selected to represent the population of Europe (Esaiasson et 
al. 2012: 229, European Social Survey 2016c).  
The hypotheses postulate that it is mobility direction that affects satisfaction with democracy 
and not the other way around. The chosen design cannot account for reversed causality, which 
is a methodological limitation. It will be left to future research to study. Another 
methodological problem is that the design and method cannot account for eventual 
inaccuracies in respondents’ answers. Sporadic inaccuracies only include minor reliability 
problems, given the large sample. However, structural inaccuracies will hurt the results 
validity greatly.  
4.4. Measurements 
Below follows a review of how the theoretical concepts will be operationalised, as well as 
discussion and operationalisation of cofounding variables. 
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4.4.1. Independent Variable — Intergenerational Social Mobility Direction 
The independent variable is intergenerational social mobility direction. This section will 
present how the independent variable is to be operationalised. First, an index on the 
relationship between individual and parental educational attainment is created out of the 
original variables in the dataset. Thereafter, two dummies for mobility direction are created to 
measure the asymmetry between upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile individuals. 
Intergenerational social mobility is usually measured by scholars as a correlation between 
parents’ and their children’s future education or income. Unfortunately, European Social 
Survey Round 8 only includes educational attainment of the parent and respondent and does 
not collect any information on parental income (European Social Survey 2016a). Therefore 
the theoretical term intergenerational social mobility is operationalised with regard to 
educational attainment.  
Education is a key indicator of social status, and one can expect educational attainment to say 
a great deal about income (Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017: 4). In fact, Roemer 
(2004:56) argues that it is parental education rather than income which determines the future 
opportunities of the child. Concerning the suggested causal mechanism, educational 
attainment is particularly appropriate to use. Failure in educational attainment is very closely 
related to feeling misfortunate and therefore affects perceptions of meritocracy (Daenekindt, 
van der Waal & de Koster 2017:5).  
Two variables for individuals’ educational attainment and father’s educational attainment are 
recoded and will be used to create the independent variable.  This thesis will operationalise 6
direction in intergenerational social mobility as the difference between the child’s and the 
father’s respective educational attainment.  7
 Higher and lower secondary education has been assumed to result in the same future prospects. Vocational 6
education with access to higher education has been assumed to result in the same future educational and 
labour prospects as general and academic secondary education. The difference is access to higher education. 
It is assumed that access to higher education to a great extent determines one’s future labour market 
opportunities. For more information on how the original variable has been recoded, see Appendix.  
 Mother’s educational attainment is not used because it might still be common for women in Europe of older 7
generations to not work. Including the mother’s educational attainment might distort the data and make 
interpretations of the results more complicated. However, it should be noted that mother’s parental education 
might very well be a determinant of the individual’s educational attainment.
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The variables for educational attainment can take values ranging between 0 and 7. The values 
are coded as follows: 0 = not completed primary school, 1 = completed primary school, 2 = 
completed vocational secondary school with no access to higher education, 3 = completed 
general or academic secondary education with access to higher education, 4 = post secondary 
education not resulting in a bachelor degree, 5 = completed a bachelor degree, 6 = completed 
a master degree and 7 = completed Ph.D studies.  From these variables, an index for mobility 8
direction is created  9
To be able to compare the directions and distinguish between upwardly, downwardly and non-
mobile individuals, two dummies are created; all individuals with lower educational 
attainment than their parent, that is those with a value of (-6) to (-1), have been given the 
value of 1 for mobility downward (Cortinas & Black 2012: 594-595). The direction of 
mobility is ordinal; the variable does not have any equidistance but can be ordered (Cortinas 
& Black 2012: 9-10, 594-595, Esaiasson et al. 2012: 348-349). The use of dummy variables 
allows ordinal level data to be analysed through regression (Cortinas & Black 2012: 282-283, 
594-595). All the individuals with values ≤ 0 are given the value of 0 indicating individuals 
not mobile downward. To be able to establish how the asymmetry in mobility direction affects 
satisfaction with democracy, a dummy for mobility upward is created according to the same 
principles as for mobility downward. In the 0 category for each dummy, the non-mobile  are 10
also included as a reference group. 
4.4.2. Dependent Variable — Satisfaction with Democracy  
The dependent variable has been operationalised as the question: how satisfied are you with 
the way democracy works in [country where respondent is resident]? The respondent can 
answer on a scale from 0, meaning very dissatisfied to 10 meaning very satisfied (European 
Social Survey 2016b). The question has been specifically designed to capture the theoretical 
meaning stated above, i.e., satisfied with the regime output rather than regime ideals 
(Dahlberg, Ekman & Holmberg 2013:5, Lind & Edman 2003, Stockemer & Sundström 
2013:141, Thomassen 2001:201, 229, Wagner, Scheider & Halla 2009:32, Quaranta & Martini 
2016). The close relationship between the theoretical term and the actual measurement of it, is 
  See Appendix and ESS8 -  Appendix 1 (2016 ) for more information.8
 See Appendix for equation for the mobility direction index.9
 Individuals with the same educational attainment as their parent. 10
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indeed one of the most prominent benefits with using the European Social Survey dataset. 
Strictly speaking, the variable is not on an interval level; it is difficult to measure individuals’ 
satisfaction in real terms. The variable will nonetheless be treated as if it was on interval scale 
(Cortinas & Black 2012: 9-10, 594-595, Esaiasson et al. 2012: 348-349, Wagner, Scheider & 
Halla 2009).  11
4.4.3. Mediator — Perceptions of Meritocracy  
The European Social Survey has one question relating to the concept of meritocracy: Large 
differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to reward differences in talents and efforts 
(European Social Survey 2016b). The argument made is that if one moves downward one  
does not agree that income differences is synonymous with rewarding talents and efforts 
(ibid). One can answer on a scale from 1-5; 1 meaning strongly agree and 5 meaning strongly 
disagree. To make the variable values more intuitive, it is recoded to 0 meaning strongly 
disagree and 4 meaning strongly agree.  
I would argue that this measurement of perceptions of meritocracy is by no means ideal, since 
it is plausible that one can perceive that rewards should be fair in relation to talents and 
efforts, only that one does not believe that large income differences are appropriate rewards. 
However this is the best measurement of perceptions of meritocracy available. Moreover, it is 
interesting to study attitudes to income differences in relation to mobility since there might be 
a relationship between mobility direction and attitudes. Given that previous studies have 
found that income inequalities are related to satisfaction with democracy, there is reason to 
believe that there exists a relationship.  
4.4.4. Cofounding Variables 
To avoid omitted variable bias that might cause spuriously drawn conclusions, other variables 
that might affect the dependent and independent variable must be controlled for (Cortinas & 
Black 2012: 494, 580, Esaiasson et al. 2012: 97-99, 346-347). A criteria for a variable to be 
controlled for is that there is reason to believe it affects both the dependent and the 
independent (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 84-85, 99, Sundell 2012a). Below follows a discussion of 
these and how they will be controlled for.   
 The same will apply to the mediator 11
!  of !22 54
Both potential explanations for levels of intergenerational social mobility and satisfaction with 
democracy are quite easy to find. To find explanations to the directions of intergenerational 
social mobility on the other hand is much more difficult due to the fact that the field of study 
is relatively new, and hence, there is not a great deal of research that gives empirical 
suggestions as to what these explanations might be. In this study I will do as previous scholars 
and control for socio-demographic variables such as gender, age and domestic origin 
(Anderson & Singer 2008, Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017, Lühiste 2014). 
Gender is operationalised as a dummy for being female  and age runs from values of 30 to 12
65. Domestic origin is a dummy for born in the country of residence  (European Social 13
Survey 2016a). 
Income inequality has a documented effect on satisfaction with democracy (Anderson & 
Singer 2008:564-565,583). It also covaries with levels of mobility, as is illustrated by the so 
called Great Gatsby Curve (Bladen 2013: 62, Causa & Johansson 2010, Corak 2006, 2013:3, 
Smeeding 2013). However, there is no empirical evidence that income inequality affects 
mobility direction and there is no intuitive relationship between directions of mobility and 
income inequality, and therefore income inequality will not be controlled for.  
Corruption has an empirically documented effect on satisfaction with democracy and affects 
levels of mobility (Boudreaux 2014, Stockemer & Sundström 2013, Wagner, Schneider & 
Halla 2009). Perceptions of corruption are also very closely related to the mediator, 
perceptions of meritocracy (ibid.). However, there are no empirical findings that indicate that 
corruption or corruption perceptions affect mobility direction. 
Education will be controlled for, since the design does not account for the fact that some 
might have parents with higher educational titles, but they do not necessarily perceive 
themselves as mobile downwards. For instance, if one has parents who have acquired Ph.D 
degrees and oneself has acquired a bachelor degree in business administration, one is going to 
be defined as mobile downward by this study’s operationalisation. That is, one will have an 
index value of (-2).  
 Value 0 = male and value 1 = female12
 Value 0 = not born in country of residence, 1 = born in country of residence 13
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If there is satisfaction among individuals mobile downward, this might be due to very 
different levels of high and low mobility in European countries. It might be noted that the 
countries with high mobility also tend to be those with extensive social protection systems, 
for instance Sweden, Denmark and Finland (OECD 2017a, 2017b). To control for the fact that 
respondents within the same country will give answers dependent of one another, the 
regressions will also include a dummy variable for each country included in the sample.  
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5. Results & Analysis  
Below follows a presentation of the study results and an analysis of the results. 
5.1. Descriptives 
Before presenting the results of the regression analysis the descriptives of all the variables 
used are presented to give an idea of how the data points are distributed; the descriptive 
statistics function as benchmarks when analysing the regression results (Sundell 2012b, 
Wagner, Scheider & Halla 2009: 35). 
5.1.1. Supporting the Operationalisation of the Independent Variable 
The descriptives in this section are presented to motivate the operationalisation of the two 
dummies for mobility direction. The data shows the distribution of the data points within the 
categories in the variables. Overall, this section gives the information that the general 
tendency is for the second generation to be more educated than the first generation (see table 
2). The mean value of educational attainment is greater than the mean value of parental 
educational attainment. 
To pinpoint that parental educational attainment predicts individual educational attainment in 
the countries in the dataset, a regression is run.  The regression is done to support the 14
operationalisation of intergenerational social mobility index. The descriptives show a 
relationship that is in line with previous findings (Björklund, Roine & Waldenström 2008, 
Corak 2013, Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017:10, Friedman 2013:1-12, Ichino, 
Karabarbounis & Moretti 2010). The correlation coefficient is quite strong, the beta-
coefficient has a value of 0,349. However it is also quite far from 1, which indicates that there 
are many other explanations to educational attainment. 
Table 2: Descriptives of educational attainment.  
Source: European Social Survey (2017) and authors’ own calculations. 
Mean Std. Deviation N
Parental educational 
attainment
2,62 1,64 29904
Educational attainment 3,39 1,54 29904
 According to the Becker and Tomes model (Frid & Hedmann 2016). 14
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Table 3: Effect of parental educational attainment on individual educational attainment, 
unstandardised beta-coefficients. (standard errors in parentheses) 
Source: European Social Survey (2017) and authors’ own calculations. 
The beta-coefficient’s value is 0,349, which is quite high compared to the high mobility 
countries in the dataset like Norway, but low compared to countries like Slovenia (see table 
1). The intercept tells us that the second generation tends to have climbed at least two steps 
higher than on the educational ladder  than their parents. This might be due to a policy 15
change of some sort, giving the second generation access to university education whether they 
enrolled in vocational secondary education or academic. The increased tendency to participate 
in higher education than one’s parent could increase the mobility direction effect, making 
individuals seem more mobile than they actually perceive themselves to be. This thesis will 
study actual mobility direction, but for this to affect satisfaction with democracy through 
perceptions about meritocratic principles, there has to be some coherence between actual 
mobility and perceived mobility. The fact that the second generation tends to be more 
educated might mean that the effect of the upward mobility is somewhat subdued and the 
effect of mobility downward is slightly amplified. This needs to be taken in to account when 
analysing the results.   
5.1.2. Descriptives of Independent, Dependent and Mediator  
In this section descriptives of the independent, dependent and the mediator are presented. 
Again, this is done to give an understanding of how the data is distributed (Wagner, Scheider 
& Halla. 2009: 35). 
Parental educational attainment 0.349** 
(0,005)
Intercept 2,475** 
(0,016)
N 29904
R2(adj) 0,138
**p<0,01
 Educational ladder is a concept borrowed from Putnam (2017).15
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From the figures below we can conclude that there is a general tendency to be more satisfied 
with democracy than dissatisfied, and that it is highly usual that one is more mobile upwards 
than downwards; only 17,4% of the sample have less educational attainment than their parent. 
Important to keep in mind is the tendency for the second generation to be more educated than 
their parents, which might explain why it is more common to be mobile upwards than 
downwards. 
The dependent variable slightly violates one of the assumptions of the regression model; it is 
not normally distributed (Cortinas & Black 2012: 502). However, the used sample size is 
asymptotic which makes the models robust against normality.  The mean value of the 16
dependant, 5,52, tells us that the respondents are fairly satisfied with their democracies.   17
The mean value of perceptions of meritocracy is 2,14. It is quite common to agree with large 
income differences being a good way to reward differences in talents and efforts.  
Table 4: Descriptives of mobility upwards, downwards, satisfaction with democracy and 
perceptions of meritocracy.  
Source: European Social Survey (2017) and authors’ own calculations. 
Variable N Mean St.deviation Min Max
Mobility down 29904 0,174 0,38 0 1
Mobility up 29904 0,497 0,50 0 1
Satisfaction 
with democracy 
32473 5,52 2,44 0 10
Perceptions of 
meritocracy 
32862 2,14 1,11 0 4
 Se Appendix for p-plot. When N → ∞ or N > 30 the normality assumption does not apply 16
 Se Appendix for distribution 17
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5.2. Bivariate Correlations  
A correlation matrix is presented below to give an understanding of how the variables are 
related to each other.  
Table 5: Correlation matrix including control variables 
Source: European Social Survey (2017) and authors’ own calculations. 
The matrix shows that the bivariate relationship is as H1 states. Individuals mobile down are 
according to this matrix less satisfied with democracy than the reference group. The Pearson 
correlation coefficients do not take very high values, which indicates that the relationship is 
not particularly strong. This might however change in the regression analysis when country 
dummies are included. Females tend to be less mobile downwards than males (-0,028) and 
older individuals tend to be less mobile downwards than younger (-0,039). Higher educated 
individuals are less mobile downwards and more mobile upwards (-0,206 for mobility down 
and 0,375 for mobility up). Whether one is born within the country or not seems to be of little 
importance. The coefficient for mobility down is not significant, meaning that we cannot be 
sure if it actually affects mobility down or not. The coefficient for mobility up is small 
Mobility 
down
Mobility 
up
Satisfactio
n with 
democrac
y
Perceptio
ns of 
meritocra
cy
Gender Age Domestic 
origin
Education
al level
Mobility 
down 
1 0,457** 0,012* 0,007 -0,023** -0,182** −0,006 −0,206**
Mobility 
up
0,457** 1 0,019** -0,017** 0,033** 0,138** -0,015* 0,375**
Satisfactio
n with 
democrac
y 
0,012* 0,019** 1 0,079** -0,028** -0,042** -0,,082** 0,132**
Perceptio
ns of 
meritocra
cy
0,007 -0,017** 0,079** 1 -0,065** -0,039** -0,022** 0,009
Gender -0,023** 0,033** -0,028** -0,065** 1 0,029** −0,005 -0,033**
Age -0,182** 0,138** -0,042** -0,039** 0,029** 1 -0,012* -0,102**
Domestic 
origin 
−0,006 -0,015* -0,082** -0,022** −0,005 -0,012* 1 -0,062**
Education
al level
-0,206** 0,375** 0,132** 0,009 0,033** -0,102** -0,062** 1
**p< 0.01 
*  p<0.05
!  of !28 54
(-0,015). Domestic origin, however, has a stronger relationship to satisfaction with 
democracy. The multicollinearity between the independent and the control variables is not 
particularly strong; none of the Pearson correlation coefficients are close or equal to 0,7 
(Cortinas & Black 2012: 611). 
For perceptions of meritocracy to be a mediator it has to have a bivariate relationship to the 
dependent and the independent respectively. There is a significant, albeit weak correlation 
between the mediator and the dummy for mobility up (-0,017). This is contradictory to 
theorised expectations. The Pearson correlation coefficient for mobility down is not 
significant. There is a slightly stronger, positive and significant correlation between the 
independent, satisfaction with democracy and the mediator (0,079). The more satisfied with 
democracy one is, the more one agrees with income differences being a good way to reward 
differences in talents and efforts. This can be interpreted as perceiving society as more 
meritocratic, which is inline with the hypotheses and previous findings (Day & Fiske 2016, 
Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017, European Social Survey 2016b). 
Perceptions of meritocracy does not, in the bivariate correlation, seem to be a mediator of the 
relationship between mobility direction and satisfaction with democracy. The relationship 
might however change in the regression when country dummies are included. 
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5.3. Regression Analysis  
Below follow a presentation and analysis of results from the linear regression models. In each 
model I included a dummy for each of the 17 countries. 
Table 6: Regression table of satisfaction with democracy as dependent variable in model 1 
and 4. Perceptions of meritocracy as dependant in model 2 and 3. Unstandardised beta 
coefficients (Standard errors within parentheses)
Source: European Social Survey (2017) and authors’ own calculations. Note: The country specific dummies are 
included in each model. The values for beta coefficients for each country can be found in the Appendix. 
Model 1 is run with the dummies for mobility direction as regressors and satisfaction with 
democracy as regressand. The two dummies are run simultaneously since the hypotheses 
focus on the asymmetry in satisfaction with democracy between mobile upwards and mobile 
downwards. Including both gives a reference group of non-mobile individuals.  The value of 18
the intercept, 4,378, tells us that individuals who are not mobile at all are moderately satisfied 
with democracy. The values range from 0-10, 4,378 is closer to 0 than to 10 and is below 5, 
which is the middle value. The middle value can be interpreted as not satisfied but not 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mobility down 0,162** 
(0,04)
0,036 
(0,19)
0,025 
(0,019)
0,159** 
(0,04)
Mobility up 0,186** 
(0,031)
−0,006 
(0,15)
-0,015 
(0,16)
0,020** 
(0,033)
Gender -0,146** 
(0,013)
-0,085** 
(0,026)
Age -0,002** 
(0,000)
-0,004** 
(0,001)´
Domestic origin -0,046 
(0,020)
-0,5** 
(0,043)
Educational level 0,017** 
(0,005)
0,159** 
(0,10)
Intercept 4,378** 
(0,087)
1,687** 
(0,04)
1,843** 
(0,51)
4,541** 
(0,110)
Adjusted R2 0,124 0,061 0,067 0,139
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 29160 29462 29374 29090
**p< 0.01 
*  p<0.05
 Non-mobile individuals are placed in the 0 category in both the dummy variables. 18
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dissatisfied. Non-mobile (i.e., having the same educational attainment as one’s parent) can 
therefore be said do be somewhat dissatisfied. This is inline with Day & Fiske’s (2016) 
findings. The positive value of the regression coefficient for mobility downwards is contrary 
to the expectations theorised. The effect of having less educational attainment than ones 
parent is 0,162 to satisfaction with a standard error of 0,04. The hypotheses stated that the 
effect would be negative. The effect is however smaller than the effect of being mobile 
upwards (a coefficient of 0,186). The effect of being mobile up on satisfaction with 
democracy is 0,08 standard deviations while the effect of being mobile down is 0,07. The 
positive value of the coefficients for mobility up and mobility down tells us that if one has 
equal educational attainment as one’s parent, one is less satisfied with democracy than if one 
has different educational attainment than ones parent, whether it be more or less. The 
relationship between mobility direction and satisfaction with democracy is also quite different 
from the one shown in the bivariate correlation matrix above. 
Model 2 is designed to analyse how well the independent predicts the value of the mediator. 
The relationship between mobility direction and whether one agrees with the statement: Large 
differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to reward differences in talents and efforts, is 
not significant. The criteria for a variable to be a mediator is that there is reason to believe that 
it is predicted by the independent (Sundell 2012a). The coefficients are not significant and do 
not take particularly high values, which suggests that the theorised expectations where 
inaccurate. The results contrast to Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster’s (2017) result, 
which suggests that there is a distinct difference between how political trust and satisfaction 
with democracy relate to mobility direction. The divergence of results in relation to 
Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster (2017) might also indicate that it is not appropriate to 
operationalise people’s perceptions of meritocracy as agreeing with income differences being 
a good way to reward talent and efforts. The relationship might however change when 
cofounding variables are included.  
Model 3 consists of model 2 and the cofounding variables. The coefficient for mobility 
upward slightly decreased while the coefficient for mobility down increased. However, non of 
the coefficients are significant. The values are also still very low. This suggests that mobility 
direction does not predicts perceptions of meritocracy. No further analysis on this matter will 
be made.  
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Model 4 consists of the independent, the dependent and the control variables. Two things can 
be concluded from the analysis of model 4. First the effect of being mobile downwards on 
satisfaction with democracy is weakened; the regression coefficient is now 0,159. Second, the 
effect of being mobile upward is very much weakened by the cofounding variables 
(regression coefficient 0,02). Age does not affect satisfaction greatly, though the coefficient of 
- 0,04 is significant. Domestic origin has a great impact on satisfaction with democracy (value 
of coefficient - 0,5). However only 12,2% of the sample  are born outside of their country.  19 20
The effect of being female slightly affects satisfaction negatively. Females are slightly less 
satisfied than males (-0,085). Educational level affects satisfaction with democracy as much 
as being mobile downward (0,159), suggesting that they are satisfied with democracy because 
of their education rather than their mobility direction. 
These results show that H1 and H2 only hold partially. First of all, the mediator seems not to 
be relevant. Individuals who are mobile downwards are less satisfied with democracy than 
individuals who have higher education than their parents, but they are more satisfied than 
non-mobile individuals. If individuals mobile upwards are satisfied, it is a result of high 
educational attainment rather than high upward mobility level. The ANOVA table for each 
model gives F-values higher than the critical F-values.  The values are significant for each 21
model with a P-value of 0,000 and are compared to a critical F-value for the same level of 
significance. This means that the null-hypothesis can be rejected for all models and that a 
model with no independent variables does not fit the data as well as the models used in this 
analysis. The positive signs of the coefficients tell us that mobile individuals are more 
satisfied with democracy than individuals who have the same educational attainment as their 
parents, which leads one to think that it is levels of mobility rather than direction, that might 
affect satisfaction with democracy. The adjusted R2 values tell us that mobility direction 
explains some variation in satisfaction with democracy. However, there are clearly more 
explanatory variables to be studied. Most of the results are through out this study statistically 
significant; p-values is almost always less than 0,01. This might be due to the sample size 
being asymptotic, which results in the p-value approaching zero. Thus, the p-values will 
 See Appendix for frequencies of cofounding variables.19
 The sample is designed to be representative of the residents in the countries included in the sample 20
(European Social Survey, 2016b). See discussion in chapter 4.
 See Appendix for model Anova tables.21
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always show significance.  Also important to remember is that the models are not as robust 22
as they ideally should be (Cortinas & Black 2012: 502, 611). This means the significance of 
the results must be interpreted with caution.  
 When N is very large or  ➝∞, p ➝ 022
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6. Conclusions  
The aim of this study was to examine how social mobility in European democracies affects 
satisfaction with democracy. Additionally, the aim was to empirically pinpoint that high 
intergenerational mobility can produce adverse outcomes. The research question was: Does 
intergenerational social mobility direction in European democracies affect satisfaction with 
democracy? 
The theoretical framework predicted that individuals who are mobile upward would tend to 
ascribe their mobility to individual talents or efforts such as cognitive skills or hard work 
ethic, while individuals mobile downwards would blame their failures on factors beyond their 
influence (Day & Fiske 2016 Daenekindt, van der Waal & de Koster 2017). Consequently, the 
hypotheses stated that mobility downwards will cause individuals to be less satisfied with 
democracy than their upwardly mobile counterparts (ibid.). The results suggest that H1 and 
H2 only partially hold. While individuals who are mobile downwards are not less satisfied 
with democracy than the reference group in general, they are however less satisfied than 
individuals mobile upward. Individuals mobile upward tend to be satisfied not because of 
mobility direction, but because they tend to be highly educated. Rather, it is non-mobile 
individuals that are the least satisfied with democracy. Below follows a summary of possible 
conclusions that can be drawn from the results presented above, as well as suggestions for 
future areas of research.  
According to the results, perceptions of meritocracy are not related to the direction of mobility 
as theorised. From this it might be concluded that perceptions of meritocracy in fact are not 
affected by mobility direction as first suggested. The divergence from the theory might be due 
to the fact that the theoretical framework is drawn from the results of Daenekindt, van der 
Waal and de Koster (2017) and Day and Fiske (2016), who study other dependent variables. 
Moreover, Day and Fiske (2016) do not study the direction but rather the level of 
intergenerational mobility, suggesting that there is more than a conceptual difference between 
mobility direction and mobility level. The divergence from Daenekindt, van der Waal and de 
Koster (2017) might be due to poor validity, since the distance between the theoretical term 
and the measurement is not ideal (Esaiasson et al. 2012:58-63). Nonetheless, it can be 
concluded that mobility direction does not affect the degree to which people agree with the 
statement: larger differences in peoples incomes are acceptable to reward differences in talent 
!  of !34 54
and effort (European Social Survey 2012a). This study encompasses a larger amount of data 
and is set in a wider context than the data used by Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster 
(2017). The extensiveness and quality of the data should allow the results to be generalised at 
least to the countries included in the sample, but also to countries with similar political 
systems. 
The positive signs of the regression coefficients tell us that mobile individuals are more 
satisfied with democracy than individuals who have the same educational attainment as their 
parents. It could be interpreted then, that it is the level of mobility, rather than the direction, 
that is of greatest significance to satisfaction with democracy. However, remembering that the 
second generation tends to be more educated, the effect of upward mobility on satisfaction 
with democracy might be subdued and the effect of mobility downward may be slightly 
amplified. This is a methodological limitation of the models used in this study; they do not 
account for this endogenous problem. Future studies should try to establish whether the trend 
to be more educated than ones parent affects this study’s conclusions. Instead of only using 
parental educational attainment as a benchmark, future studies can compare average 
educational attainment in the second generation with divergences from it. This might give 
answers to whether relative mobility in relation to others in the same generation matters as 
much as absolute mobility in relation to one’s parent.  
The asymmetry between upward mobility and downward mobility are in line with both the 
hypotheses of this study and Daenekindt, van der Waal and de Koster’s (2017) results. 
However, the reasons as to why remain unclear; is it mobility direction or educational level 
that matters? From this one can conclude that more research on the relationship between 
intergenerational social mobility and regime support is needed. If educational level is the 
reason for upwardly mobile individuals to be more satisfied than downwardly mobile, what is 
it with education that creates this asymmetry? Causes of the satisfaction gap between non-
mobile and mobile need to be further studied since inequality in satisfaction might itself 23
cause certain political outcomes between groups within our societies. The fact that non-
mobile individuals are the least satisfied also implies that high intergenerational social 
mobility is better than low.  I have in this thesis however postulated high mobility, but one 
 Inequality in satisfaction is a term borrowed from Wagner, Scheider & Halla (2009).23
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might ask is if there a breaking point. Maybe downward mobility is more common in 
Denmark than in Slovenia because the overall level of mobility is higher. Future studies could 
explore this through for instance, cross-country comparisons. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Coding of Variables  
Values of the original values from the European Social Survey Round 8 (2016a) 
Highest level of education (edulvlb) Father’s highest level of Education (edulvlfb) 
0 = "Not completed ISCED level 1” 
113 = "ISCED 1, completed primary education” 
129 = "Vocational ISCED 2C < 2 years, no access ISCED 3” 
212 = "General/pre-vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational” 
213 = "General ISCED 2A, access ISCED 3A general/all 3” 
221 = "Vocational ISCED 2C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 3” 
222 = "Vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational” 
223 = "Vocational ISCED 2, access ISCED 3 general/all” 
229 = "Vocational ISCED 3C < 2 years, no access ISCED 5” 
311 = "General ISCED 3 >=2 years, no access ISCED 5” 
312 = "General ISCED 3A/3B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A” 
313 = "General ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5” 
321 = "Vocational ISCED 3C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 5” 
322 = "Vocational ISCED 3A, access ISCED 5B/ lower tier 5A” 
323 = "Vocational ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5” 
412 = "General ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A” 
413 = "General ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5” 
421 = "ISCED 4 programmes without access ISCED 5” 
422 = "Vocational ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A” 
423 = "Vocational ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5” 
510 = "ISCED 5A short, intermediate/academic/general tertiary below bachelor” 
520 = "ISCED 5B short, advanced vocational qualifications” 
610 = "ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from lower tier tertiary” 
620 = "ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary” 
710 = "ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from lower tier tertiary” 
720 = "ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary” 
800 = "ISCED 6, doctoral degree” 
5555 = ”Other" 
7777 = ”Refusal" 
8888 = "Don't know” 
9999 = "No answer” 
Recoded to (ESS8 - Appendix 1 2016:3-6) for two variables —  individual educational attainment and 
father’s educational attainment  
0 → 0 = not completed primary school 
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113 → 1 = completed primary school 
129, 212, 221, 222 229, 311, 321, 323, 421 → 2 = completed vocational secondary school with no 
access to higher education 
213, 223, 312, 313, 322, 412, 413, 422, 423 → 3 = completed general or academic secondary 
education with access to higher education 
510, 520 → 4 = post secondary education not resulting in a bachelor degree 
610, 620 → 5 = completed a bachelor degree 
710, 720 → 6 = completed a master degree  
800 → 7 = completed Ph.D studies. 
All other values → ”system missing”  
8.2 Equation for Mobility Index  
(individual educational attainment) − (father’s educational attainment) = mobility direction  
8.3 P-plots  
Model 1: Satisfaction with democracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as independent  
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Model 2: The mediator Perceptions of meritocracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as 
independent 
Model 3: The mediator Perceptions of meritocracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as 
independent, including cofounding variables age, domestic origin, gender and education 
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Model 4: Satisfaction with democracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as independent, 
including cofounding variables age, domestic origin, gender and education 
8.4 Residual Plots  
Model 1: Satisfaction with democracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as independent 
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Model 2: The mediator Perceptions of meritocracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as 
independent 
Model 3: The mediator Perceptions of meritocracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as 
independent, including cofounding variables age, domestic origin, gender and education 
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Model 4: Satisfaction with democracy as dependent, country and mobility dummies as independent, 
including cofounding variables age, domestic origin, gender and education  
8.5 Regression Coefficients for Country-dummies 
Model 1  
Country Unstandardised beta coefficient (standard error within 
parenthesis) 
Austria 1,282** 
(0,099)
Belgium 1,282** 
(0,101)
Switzerland 2,944** 
(0,104)
The Czech Republic 0,709** 
(0,098)
Germany 1.416** 
(0,096)
Estonia 0,649** 
(0,100)
Finland 1,733** 
(0,100)
France −0,152 
(0,100)
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Model 2  
The United Kingdom 0,855** 
(0,102)
Ireland 0,934** 
(0,097)
Israel 0,397** 
(0,097)
Iceland 1,328** 
(0,116)
The Netherlands 1,666** 
(0,103)
Norway 2,712** 
(0103)
Poland 0,230 
(0,103)
Sweden 1,935** 
(0,104)
Slovenia −0,642** 
(0,106)
**p< 0.01 
*  p<0.05
Country Unstandardised beta coefficient (standard error within 
parenthesis) 
Austria 0,283** 
(0,046)
Belgium 0,361** 
(0,047)
Switzerland 0,0468** 
(0,048)
The Czech Republic 0,847** 
(0,045)
Germany 0,505** 
(0,044)
Estonia 0,046** 
(0,046)
Finland -0,144** 
(0,046)
France 0,376** 
(0,046)
The United Kingdom 0,589* 
(0,047)
Ireland 0,763** 
(0,044)
Israel 0,456* 
(0,045)
Iceland 0,097** 
(0,053)
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Model 3 
The Netherlands 0,543** 
(0,047)
Norway 0,407** 
(0,047)
Poland 0,847** 
(0,047)
Sweden 0,847** 
(0,048)
Slovenia -0,055 
(0,049)
**p< 0.01 
*  p<0.05
Country Unstandardised beta coefficient (standard error within 
parenthesis) 
Austria 0,293** 
(0,019)
Belgium 0,355** 
(0,047)
Switzerland 0,457** 
(0,048)
The Czech Republic 0,858** 
(0,045)
Germany 0,495** 
(0,044)
Estonia 0,669** 
(0,046)
Finland -0135** 
(0,046)
France 0,394** 
(0,047)
The United Kingdom 0,608** 
(0,047)
Ireland 0,764** 
(0,044)
Israel 0,441** 
(0,045)
Iceland 0,1 
(0,053)
The Netherlands 0,555** 
(0,047)
Norway 0,394** 
(0,047)
Poland 0,858** 
(0,047)
Sweden 0,410** 
(0,048)
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Model 4: 
8.7. Descriptives & Frequencies of Cofounding Variables 
Slovenia -0,042 
(0,013)
**p< 0.01 
*  p<0.05
Country Unstandardised beta coefficient (standard error within 
parenthesis) 
Austria 1,365** 
(0,099)
Belgium 1,074** 
(0,101)
Switzerland 2,898** 
(0,104)
The Czech Republic 0,880** 
(0,097)
Germany 1,422** 
(0,097)
Estonia 0,681** 
(0,099)
Finland 1.872** 
(0,099)
France 0,012 
(0,1)
The United Kingdom 0,963** 
(0,102)
Ireland 1,032** 
(0,097)
Israel 0,374** 
(0,097)
Iceland 1,418** 
(0,115)
The Netherlands 1,758** 
(0,102)
Norway 2,714** 
(0,102)
Poland 0,394** 
(0,102)
Sweden 2,040** 
(0,104)
Slovenia -0,5** 
(0,43)
**p< 0.01 
*  p<0.05
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8.7.1. Descriptives 
8.7.2. Frequencies  
Note: only respondents aged 30-65 are included in the analysis  
Mean Std. Deviation N
Domestic origin 0,880 0,325 33149
Age 49,01 18,867 33307
Gender 0,518 0,499 33423
Educational level 3,339 1,53 33265
Gender Valid percent
0(Not female) 48,2
1(Female) 51,8
Domestic origin Valid percent
0(Not domestic 
origin)
12,0
1(Domestic origin) 88,0
Age Valid percent Cumulative percent 
15-25 12,80 12,8
26-35 14,9 27,7
36-45 15,9 43,6
46-55 17,1 60,7
56-65 17,2 77,9
66-75 13,7 91,6
76-85 6,9 98,5
86-95 1,5 100
96-105 0 100
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8.8 ANOVA Tables for All Models 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 
Educational level Valid percent
0 0,8
1 6,5
2 24,9
3 34,0
4 8,4
5 11,8
6 12,5
7 1,2
∑ squares df Mean Square F-value Sig.
Regression 21295 19 1121 218 0,000
Residual 150030 29149 5,147
Total 171324 29168
∑ squares df Mean Square F-value Sig.
Regression 2243 19 118 101 0,000
Residual 34271 29442 1
Total 366514 29461
∑ squares df Mean Square F-value Sig.
Regression 2456 23 107 92 0,000
Residual 33957 29350 1
Total 36412 29373
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∑ squares df Mean Square F-value Sig.
Regression 23920 23 1040 206 0,000
Residual 147079 29066 5
Total 170998 29089
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